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1. Commenting upon the election for the People's Chamber, informed SED quarters stated that the SED was well aware that this form of election was a provocation of the population and was bound to have repercussions after the election. The party took upon itself this burden, however, to gain the acclaim of the USSR. The SED resolved to make any conciliatory gestures and to rule more harshly to crush the resistance which it had engendered. It has chosen the adoption of a resolution for submission in the course of the reunification talks, and it has made preparations for the stabilization of the economic situation in the second Five-Year Plan. If the SED leadership had received directives from the Soviet Government similar to those which have been observed in Western Germany it would, perhaps, not have decreed this severe mode of election.
2. The differences between the tactics of the SED leadership and the concession tactics employed by the Soviet leadership have widened, probably because of recurrent fears by the high-ranking SED functionaries that they may be sacrificed in the event of greater readiness for concessions by the USSR. There appears to be no concrete tactical SED plan for the reunification of Germany.
3. Asked if it would not have been more effective if a limited number of negative votes had been admitted in the election, a high-ranking SED functionary answered that if they had admitted 20 or 30 percent of opposition votes, there would have been evidence of a substantial opposition in East Germany and possibly the necessity of admitting an opposition party in parliament. This answer shows the attitude of the SED toward free elections suggested by Molotov.
4. The last-minute preparations for the election of the People's Chamber proves that Geneva as well as the failure of the EDC failed to give the SED leadership added self-confidence. Instead, they became less self-assured as a result of the London Conference and the possible consequences of the Paris Conference.

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